STORY

At 1936 hours, the Fire Alarm Office (FAO) received a still alarm for the address of 332 Summer St., and dispatched Engine 39 and Ladder 18 to the location. At 1937 hours, the FAO transmitted Box 711, Summer Street "&" A Street. At 1938 hours, Ladder 18 reported heavy fire showing from the fire location. The weather conditions at the time were: temperature 18-24 degrees, wind 10-15 mph.

At 1939 hours, Deputy Chief Magoon, Division 1, the first arriving chief officer, assumed command. At 1940 hours, District Chief McMahon, District 6, reported to Chief Magoon and was ordered to to the rear of the building to investigate and report. Summer Street in the area is located at a higher grade than the surrounding area. Thus, the rear of of the fire building was two stories below the front of the building. The building was an six-story structure from the Summer Street (front) side, and an eight-story structure from the Congress Street (rear) side.

At 1942 hours, Chief Magoon reported to the FAO that a working fire was in progress. The department was faced with a rapidly spreading overlapping fire which was being punctuated by several internal explosions, which intensified and spread the fire along the entire front of the fire building. At 1943 hours, Chief McMahon reported fire showing from the upper six floors at the rear of the fire building.

At 1944 hours, Chief Magoon ordered the second alarm, followed by the third alarm at 1949 hours. A fourth alarm was ordered at 2003 hours.

Chief of Department George Paul arrived shortly after the fourth alarm was transmitted, and assumed command. Chief Paul ordered the fifth alarm at 2039 hours. Subsequently, a total of twelve extra companies were ordered to asist in fire control. Fire Commissioner James H. Kelly arrived at the scene shortly after Chief Paul arrived.

Chief Paul's plan was to blacken the fire with heavy stream appliances, and then penetrate all floors with hand lines to complete extinguishment. This plan was carried out despite severe icing conditions that increased as time went by, and until the upper floors were found to be in danger of collapse. Heavy stream appliances were used at this time, until the upper floors did collapse, followed by the lower floors. Heavy stream appliances were operated until the major fire were extinguished. Whereupon fire companies not actually operating at the fire were dismissed.

Heavy stream appliances were used throughout the night. The Building Department the building unsafe and ordered demolition of the building due to severe fire damage. A wrecking crew was hired to demolish the building, which began on 1/12/73 and completed on 1/17/73. A fire detail was maintained throughout the demolition process, in order to control deep seated fires and hot spots. This detail required the services of fifty fire companies and two hundred fifty firefighters, and lasted for a period of five days. The total damage was estimated at $300,000.

Despite the adverse weather conditions and heavy fire load, only two firefighters sustained injuries: Firefighter Ciampa, Ladder 19, struck by a window frame while ventilating; Firefighter J. Murphy, Lighting Plant 1, exhaustion and/or heart attack. Both members were transported to Boston City Hospital.

The response to the fire was as follows: